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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Rubio argued that the district court erred when it denied his
motion to dismiss the information and when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal. He
also argued that the district court erred when it incorrectly instructed the jury.

The State

concedes that Mr. Rubio is entitled to a new trial because the district court improperly instructed
the jury. As such, this reply brief only addresses the State’s arguments that this Court should not
review the district court’s denial of Mr. Rubio’s motion to dismiss, and that the district court did
not err when it denied Mr. Rubio’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Rubio’s appellant’s brief. They need not be repeated in this reply brief, but are incorporated
herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Rubio’s motion to dismiss because a community
service timecard is not an instrument that might be filed under any law; therefore, there
was no probable cause to believe Mr. Rubio committed the crime of offering a false or
forged instrument for record?

II.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rubio’s Rule 29 motion for judgment of
acquittal?

III.

Did the district court err by incorrectly instructing the jury and reducing the State’s
burden of proof to prove all the elements?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Rubio’s Motion To Dismiss Because A Community
Service Timecard Is Not An Instrument That Might Be Filed Under Any Law; Therefore, There
Was No Probable Cause To Believe Mr. Rubio Committed The Crime Of Filing A False
Instrument
The State concedes that Mr. Rubio’s trial was unfair because some of the district court’s
jury instructions “invaded the jury’s function to determine whether the state proved certain
elements of the crime,” and this violated Mr. Rubio’s right to due process. (Resp. Br., pp.9-11.)
However, the State relies on State v. Maylett, 108 Idaho 671, 672 (Ct. App. 1985) to argue that
this Court should not examine the sufficiency of the evidence because Mr. Rubio was convicted
“after a trial.” (Resp. Br., pp.7-9.) Maylett, however, does not support that argument. Rather,
Maylett makes it clear that appellate courts will not examine the sufficiency of the evidence
presented at a preliminary hearing if “a defendant has been convicted following a fair trial . . . .”
Id. (emphasis added). In Maylett, the Court of Appeals held that Mr. Maylett was convicted after
a fair trial and therefore declined “to examine the sufficiency of the evidence presented at
Maylett’s preliminary examination.” Id. Thus, the State’s argument on this issue is without
merit; the trial in this case is not a bar to this Court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rubio’s Rule 29 Motion For Judgment Of
Acquittal
Mr. Rubio argued in his appellant’s brief that the district court should have granted
Mr. Rubio’s I.C.R. 29 motion because no rational trier of fact could have found the timecard was
an “instrument” that, if genuine, might have been filed under any law. (App. Br., pp.19-23;
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I.C. § 18-3203.) In other words, after the trial, the State had still not presented sufficient
evidence on each of the elements such that the jury could find Mr. Rubio guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. In response, the State argues that—if the jury had been properly instructed—
the evidence presented by the State at the trial was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. (Resp.
Br., pp.11-19.) However, the State’s attempts to provide reasoned analysis on whether the jury
could find that the timecard was an instrument that could be filed under a law ultimately run up
against the same basic problems the district court encountered; the facts of this case did not
support prosecution under I.C. § 18-3203.
For example, the State argues that the jury, if it had been given the definition of an
instrument that this Court adopted in Steel Farms v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259 (2012),
would have found that Mr. Rubio’s timecard fit that definition. (Resp. Br., pp.13-17.) But the
State’s reliance on Steel Farms illustrates how dramatically different Mr. Rubio’s timecard was
from the instrument in Steel Farms. As the State explains, the issue in Steel Farms was whether
a handwritten interlineation on an original contract had to be in a different instrument in order to
satisfy the lease’s merger clause. Id. at 265. The Court noted that the language of the merger
clause stated that the contract constituted the “entire agreement between Landlord and Tenant . . .
.” Id. It went on to hold that the handwritten amendment was effective because the “handwritten
interlineation inscribed upon an existing contract appears on a written instrument.”

Id.

(emphasis added). Mr. Rubio’s timecard was clearly not a contract that constituted an agreement
between the district court and Mr. Rubio. Nevertheless, the State asserts that the timecard
“defined Mr. Rubio’s duty to complete 56 hours of community service.” (Resp. Br., p.16.) This
is almost exactly what the district court said when it denied Mr. Rubio’s motion to dismiss, and it
is simply wrong. (6/28/16 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-12.) The timecard was not a contract as in Steel
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Farms, and it did not define Mr. Rubio’s duties. Therefore, it did not meet the definition of an
instrument.
The State goes on to assert that Mr. Rubio’s writing on his timecard, was “similar to the
interlineation in Steel Farms” because it “helped define his rights and liabilities. Specifically, his
forgery of the hours worked, helped define Rubio’s right not to have his probation violated.”
(Resp. Br., p.16 (emphasis added).) This makes no sense; there is no such “right.” Mere
handwriting on a piece of paper, timecard or otherwise, does not create a contract. The State’s
attempt to fabricate some kind of a definition of “rights and liabilities” based on the timecard so
as to compare it to a contract is simply too much of a stretch. The interlineation in Steel Farms
was on an existing contract, and here the only things that defined Mr. Rubio’s obligations were
the district court’s order that he complete 56 hours of community service time, and the
community service contract, not the timecard itself. (See R., p.68.)
The State takes a similarly unsupportable position on the issue of whether there was a law
under which Mr. Rubio’s timecard could have been filed, claiming that the filing of any
document with a court is a “filing under any law,” and that “under any law” really adds nothing
to the term “filed.” (Resp. Br., pp.18-19.) Essentially, the State reads “under any law” out of
I.C. § 18-3203 and argues that if something is merely filed, it complies. It asserts that, because
there is no statutory definition of filing “under any law,” the term would have been given its
plain, non-technical meaning in the jury instructions. (Resp. Br., p.18.) It argues, “Here, the
plain, non-technical meaning of filing ‘under any law’ simply refers to the lawful act of filing a
legal document with the court.” (Resp. Br., p.18.) Finally, it contends that the statute does not
require that the instrument be filed under a law, only that it “‘might be filed ‘under any law of
this state.’” (Resp. Br., p.18.)
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These claims ignore the Court of Appeals’ Opinion in State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856
(Ct. App. 2006), relied on in the appellant’s brief. (App. Br., p.18.) In Callaghan, the Court of
Appeals made it clear that filing under a law is a requirement: “We further note that the parties
have offered no law . . . . that could be construed in this case as fulfilling the ‘under any law’
requirement of I.C. § 18-3203 . . . .” Id. at 859, n.4 (emphasis added). Thus, the “might” in the
statute does not mean this element is optional as the State argues; it means that the statute would
only apply if a person could file the instrument under or pursuant to a law. That was not the case
here. Mr. Rubio submitted his timecard pursuant to a court order, not a law. (App. Br., pp.1617.) Thus, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Rubio’s I.C.R. 29 motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Rubio respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal for the
offense, or remand for a new trial.
DATED this 4th day of December, 2017.

___________/s/______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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